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After the Kazan meeting of the presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, stories about the 
history of Nagorno-Karabakh began to increase in number on the pages of various media 
outlets. As a rule, in most of them, the history of Nagorno-Karabakh both in the Soviet period 
and in the period of its being jointed to the Russian empire in the first half of the 19th century 
was seriously distorted. Distortion, and at times crude falsification of the history of actual 
events by professional historians, causes deep regret. Who profits from this reworking of real 
events and the creation of invented history in order to support present-day political 
circumstances, when a factually correct history has been scrupulously prepared by Russian 
officials and when the actual correspondence of the military and diplomatic services of Russia, 
has been preserved in Russian archives?  
With the arrival of Russia in Karabakh at the beginning of the 19th century, a new political 
situation arose. The policy of Russia, directed toward the establishment of a social-ethnic base 
in the form of Armenians, led to the strengthening of the Christian element in Karabakh. The 
essence of the disputes observed today, have roots that reach precisely to those times. Having 
finally conquered Georgia in 1801, Russia moved toward the borders of Azerbaijan. General 
P.D. Tsitsianov, who commanded Russian forces in the Caucasus, laid siege to Ganja, the 
largest of the cities of Azerbaijan, in March 1803. Having overcome the serious resistance of 
the population led by Javad-khan, Russian forces entered the city on January 3, 1804. In order 
to strengthen his position in the Transcaucasus, Tsitsianov had to conquer the Karabakh, 
Sheki, and Shirvan khanates, which were considered the strongest in this region. During the 
course of long negotiations, Tsitsianov threatened these khanates, demanded that they 
consider the sad experience of Ganja and, taking into consideration the military might of 
Russia, accept its protection without resistance. In doing so, Tsitsianov understood perfectly 
well that Iran had interests in the region and therefore did not push events. Moreover, he had 
to consider the far from small military potential of the Muslim khanates themselves.  
Finding himself constantly “between the hammer and the anvil” (Russia in the North and Iran in 
the South), Ibrahim Khalil-khan, the ruler of Karabakh, decided to conclude with Russia “a 
solemn promise,” a treaty which in fact became the first legal document on the path of the 
joining of Karabakh to Russia. The treaty between the Karabakh Khanate and the Russian 
Empire about the transition of the khanate under the power of Russia was signed on May 14, 
1805 in the military encampment at Kurakchay, and therefore it passed into history as the 
“Kurakchay Treaty.” The document consists of 11 articles and gives Russia a one-sided 
primacy. From then on, the Karabakh Khanate passed under the protection of Russia and 
rejected any attempt at independent international ties with third countries. More than that, it 
was especially noted that the Karabakh Khanate lost the right of independent communication 
with the neighboring khanates. And the Karabakh khan was also obligated to contribute to the 
Russian treasury every year 8,000 chervontsy (24,000 Russian rubles) and also to pay for the 
expenses of his grandson who was kept in Tiflis in the residence of the commander in chief as a 
hostage. One of the most difficult conditions of the treaty was an agreement on the dislocation 
in the Shusha fortress of 500 Russian soldiers with cannon.  
The only article of the Kurakchay Treaty, which could be considered as favoring Ibrahim Khalil-
khan, was the obligation by Russia not to interfere in the internal affairs of the khanate. It is 
interesting to note that immediately after the signing of the treaty, Ibrahim Khalil-khan by a 
decree of Aleksandr I on July 8, 1805, was given the rank of general and from that time 
forward as a lieutenant general he was forced to subordinate himself to the commander-in-
chief of Russian forces in the Caucasus. This treaty, being a diplomatic document, testifies that 
the Karabakh Khanate became a protectorate of Russia precisely as a Muslim state. [1]  
The seizure of the strategically vital Karabakh Khanate, in fact, meant the beginning of the 
complete subordination of all the khanates of northern Azerbaijan. The mountainous part of the 
khanate allowed for the exercise of real control over all the western districts of Azerbaijan. 
Subsequent actions did not represent a major problem for Russia. At the same time, while 
considering each in his own way the historical fates of the people, the khans could not create a 
single union. Justly assessing the importance of the joining of Karabakh to Russia, Prince P.D. 
Tsitsianov after the conclusion of the Kurakchay Treaty on May 22, 1805, reported to the 
Russian emperor that Karabakh by its geographic location is the gate to Azerbaijan and that 
Karabakh brings Georgia closer to Baku, the seizure of which was planned for the fall. [2]  
The Azerbaijani khans followed with interest the course of the first Russian-Iranian war (1804-
1813). While they desired the victory of the southern neighbor, they were also afraid of it and 
did not cease to hope that by the results of the war they would be able to increase their own 
independence. In its turn, the Russian Army did not especially trust the local Muslims. In 1806, 
when Iran attempted an attack on Shusha, Major Lisanevich, the chief of the fortress garrison, 
wary of the unexpected actions by the Karabakh khan, slaughtered the entire family of Ibrahim 
Khalil-khan with the exception of one son, Mehdi Guli-aga. This event only confirmed the 
symbolic nature of the appointment of the Karabakh khan to the rank of lieutenant general of 
Russian forces. At the same time, having dealt summarily with Ibrahim Khalil-khan, Russia did 
not change the status of his khanate. Mehdi Guli-aga by order of the Emperor Aleksandr I of 
September 10, 1806, was named ruler of Karabakh in place of his father. [3]  
As a sign of Mehdi Guli-aga’s status as the administrator of the khanate, Emperor Aleksandr I 
presented him with a banner and sword set with precious stones. And just as in the Kurakchay 
Treaty, so too in the emperor’s appointment of Mehdi Guli-aga as ruler of Karabakh, there is 
reference to the Javanshir family as the rulers of Karabakh, both mountainous and lowland, 
and to the fact that all strata of the population of these reasons are subordinate to Mehdi Guli-
aga. The new khan was filled with hatred to the Iranians and distrust to the Russians who had 
slaughtered his family, but in the end, the anti-Iranian attitudes came out on top.  
The victory over Napoleon led to a toughening of the Eastern Policy of Russia. General A.P. 
Yermolov, who was appointed governor of the Caucasus in 1816 from the very first days did 
not trust the Muslim people, seeing them as a potential enemy. For this reason, he sought the 
opportunity for the formal liquidation of the khanates, which he thought at any moment could 
become the nucleus of a movement for independence. The representative of Yermolov in 
Northern Azerbaijan, an Armenian General V.G. Madatov, actively helped him in this. Slowly, 
but faithfully, they realized their plan. In 1819, they liquidated the Shaki khanate. Not being 
able to resist Russian pressure, Mehdi Guli-aga fled to Iran, and the Karabakh khanate was 
converted into a Russian province. A. Griboyedov wrote that together with the khan, three 
thousand Muslim families moved to Iran. And, thus, in spite of what had been written in the 
various treaties, the process of the liquidation of the khanates reached its logical conclusion.  
In 1826, the second Russian-Iranian war began. And again, the main events developed in 
Karabakh. For 48 days, the Iranian forces laid siege to Shusha, but they were not able to take 
the city. On February 10, 1828, in the settlement of Turkmanchay near Tabriz, the two sides 
concluded a new peace treaty, according to which all the khanates of Northern Azerbaijan, 
including Karabakh, Nakchivan and Irevan khanates finally became part of the Russian Empire.  
There were many interesting moments in the process of uniting the South Caucasus to Russia. 
In recent times, a number of Armenian and Russian historians, as well as certain political 
circles, have been asserting the Karabakh was joined to Russia as an Armenian district. Certain 
contemporary Russian and Armenian scholars insist that in the course of the entire 18th 
century, the Armenians of Karabakh made up 97 percent of the total population of this region. 
A question arises in this case: if this was really so, why then wasn’t it an Armenian state that 
arose in Karabakh in the middle of the 18th, but it rather was the Karabakh khanate, which was 
headed by representatives of the famous Turkic tribe of the Javanshirs? Indeed, there is no 
single case in history where three percent of the population could create a state on the backs of 
the other 97 percent.  
However, a careful study of the international legal documents of this period raises some 
interesting questions concerning the form of the inclusion into Russia not only of Karabakh, but 
also of Armenia itself. Thus, Georgia, according to the Georgian treaty of 1801 and the 
Azerbaijan khanates by the Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) treaties were included in 
Russia. A reasonable question arises: According to what treaty, agreement or declaration did 
Armenia and the territories to which it makes claims pass into Russia? Well-known Armenian 
historians have found a very easy answer to this question. Not observing scholarly ethics and 
historical evidence and not being restrained by long established historical truth, they write that 
“According to the Gulistan Treaty of 1813 which ended the Russian-Persian War of 1804-1813, 
along with other northeastern provinces of Eastern Armenia (Lori-Pambak, Shamshadin, 
Zangazur, Kafan and Shoragel districts), the Ganja and Karabakh khanates were transferred to 
Russia as well … According to the terms of the Turkmanchay Treaty (February 1828), which 
ended the second Russian-Persian War (1826-1828), the Yerevan and Nakhchivan khanates 
and Ordubad district passed to Russia. This completed the final unification of all eastern 
Armenian lands to Russia.” [4]  
In an effort to support their falsification of history, they cite the collection of documents 
published by G. Yusefovich in Petersburg in 1869. [5] They do so even though they know 
perfectly well that neither in the Gulistan nor in the Turkmanchay treaties published in 
Yusefovich’s collection, there is no reference to any Armenian lands—neither eastern nor 
Western; nor is there even a single reference to Christian lands. There is only reference to 
Muslim khanates and their unification with Russia. The absolute majority of the population of 
the Irevan khanate consisted of Muslims and this was reflected in Russian sources. In 1828, for 
example, when the “Armenian oblast” was created within the borders of the Irevan and 
Nakhchivan khanates, three-quarters of its population consisted of Muslims. This is confirmed 
by a letter of General Paskevich to the chief of the General Staff, in which he expresses his 
dissatisfaction with the actions of General Krasovsky, who was named chief of the “provisional 
administration” of Irevan and of Archbishop Nerses, a member of this administration. Paskevich 
criticizes Krasovsky for allowing Nerses to exercise unlimited influence over all affairs and in 
the harmful protection of Armenians, when “three quarters of the population of the oblast 
consist of Muslims.” [6]  
The khanates’ loss of their special status meant the transformation of Karabakh into a colony, 
and this process lasted for decades. Over the course of this period, the administrative division 
of the Trans-Caucasus was frequently changed and only had finally formed by the second half 
of the 19th century. Following the liquidation of the khanates, the comendant system of 
administration was introduced in Northern Azerbaijan. All of Karabakh with a center in Shusha 
was included in the Military-Muslim District. However, such distribution certainly did not 
correspond with the ethnographic, historical, and religious peculiarities of the local population. 
In Karabakh, this took place in a particularly sharp way.  
 
Demography was gradually converted into an instrument of policy. At the dawn of Armenian 
resettlement into these areas, a document of July 19, 1811—one that was prepared for the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia—noted that there lived 12,000 families in Karabakh oblast, 
of which 2,500 were Armenian and the remainder were followers of the religion of Muhammad. 
[7] In 1823, the Russian administration prepared “A Description of the Karabakh Province,” 
which contained statistical data about the population of this district and its ethno-religious 
composition. Judging by the statistical data prepared by Russian institutions and included in 
this valuable source, there were 600 settlements in the Karabakh oblast at that time, of which 
450 were Muslim and only 150 registered as Armenian. [8] According to this reliable source, 
20,095 families lived in Karabakh oblast in 1823, of whom 15,729 were Muslims and only 4,366 
(21.7 percent) were Armenians.  
According to the 1832 census, the number of families in Karabakh reached 20,456, but the 
number of Armenian families over these very same ten years rose to 31.6 percent. [9] In 
Shusha, which was considered the center of Karabakh, of the 1,532 families in 1823, 1,111 
were Muslim (72.5 percent), 421 were Armenian (27.5 percent), but already by 1832 because 
of Armenian re-settlers, this figure reached 44.9 percent. The Russian military historian V. 
Potto notes that the first major resettlement of Armenians to Karabakh took place in 1828. He 
writes that on March 16, 1828, 40,000 Armenian families left Persia for Irevan oblast. However, 
because of a shortage of bread, 5,000 families—the first group of re-settlers—were forced for a 
long time to wait on the shores of the Araz, but were eventually sent to Karabakh. [10]  
The Russian writer S.N. Glinka provides some interesting data on the movement of Armenians 
from Iran to Karabakh. The political character of the resettlement of Iranian Armenians in 
Muslim lands just seized by Russia is clearly evident in the appeal to the Persian Armenians by 
an active participant of this resettlement, G. Lazarev: “Christians! According to reliable rumors 
which have reached me, badly intentioned people are trying to disseminate not only foolish and 
false news, but even to sow fear in those seeking resettlement about Russia’s good intentions 
and thus to change the desire of their hearts.” [11] He writes further that “Armenians from 
various settlements, emboldened by Turkmanchay, moved toward Karabakh,” [12] and in the 
course of three and a half months, “more than 8,000 families crossed the Araz.” [13] In the 
spring of 1828, when the flood of Armenians moved toward the Araz, a directive from 
Paskevich was issued to resettle the poorest in Karabakh, and this also found reflection in the 
Russian literature of that time. [14] As a result, in 1832, Armenians formed 31.6 percent of the 
population of Karabakh, with Muslims still retaining their majority of 68.4 percent. [15]  
After 1828, the resettlement of Armenians into the Muslim provinces of the South Caucasus 
was regulated by Paragraph XV of the Turkmanchay Treaty. [16] By a decree of Emperor 
Nikolay I on March 21, 1828, “an Armenian oblast” was established on the lands of the former 
Irevan and Nakhchivan khanates. [17] The Russian general and Georgian Prince A. 
Chavchavadze was named the head of “the Armenian oblast.” [18]  
In the second volume of the historical novel of Catherine’s time, “The Favorite” by V. Pikul, the 
well-known author of historical novels, there is an interesting conversation between Count G. 
Potemkin and Catherine II, in which the former advises that the appearance of new Armenian 
communities in the Transcaucasus will create problems if not now then in the future. When he 
was creating his historical works, Pikul scrupulously worked in the archives and strictly guided 
himself on the basis of historical documents. At the moment of the formation of this oblast, 75 
percent of its population consisted of Muslims. If during the period of the Russian conquest, 
49,875 Muslims lived with 20,073 Armenians, then immediately after the formation of “the 
Armenian oblast” 45,200 Armenians were resettled from neighboring countries. [19] The 
situation in Nakhchivan oblast evolved in a similar way. At the moment of the completion of the 
Russian occupation, 17,138 Muslims and only 2,690 Armenians lived there. With the liquidation 
of the khanate, 10,670 Armenians in a short interval of time resettled there. In an analogous 
way, in the Ordubad part of Nakhchivan, where initially 7,247 Muslims and 2,388 Armenians 
lived, 1,340 Armenians were resettled in order to change the balance between them. [20]  
The Russian researcher N.I. Shavrov in 1911 published a book in which, basing himself on 
documents, he noted that 40,000 Armenians from Iran and 84,600 from Turkey resettled in the 
Caucasus in 1828-1830, and they were settled in Yelizavetpol and Irevan guberniyas, where 
before this, the number of Armenians was almost equal to zero. N. Shavrov wrote that “of the 
1.3 million Armenians who are living in the Transcaucasus, more than a million are re-settlers. 
We resettled them here.” [21] 
Apparently, the desire to completely Christianize the Transcaucasus was strong. But the 
specific features of the situation led the Russians to act carefully, and A. S. Griboyedov, the 
Russian ambassador to Persia, warned that the Armenians would remain permanently in the 
lands to which they were resettled, something that could trigger problems with the indigenous 
Muslim population. [22] Such concerns, which were shared by the Azerbaijanis, were justified. 
The Armenians settled down on Azerbaijani lands and a little later began to display hostility 
toward the masters of these lands. I. Chavchavadze justly noted in his appeal to Armenians 
seeking to settle in Georgia that they must not view those accepting them as enemies. [23]  
In the course of the entire 20th century and especially in the last two decades, Azerbaijan and 
the Azerbaijani people have experienced and are experiencing pain and suffering for their 
“hospitality” in relation to Armenians, one which A. Griboyedov and I. Chavchavadze so 
precisely predicted.  
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